A Summary of The Problems That Invalidate The Authors' Model Of Ideational Structure

Martin & Doran (2023: 44, 45):

By way of summarising our discussion we extend Table 1 above as Table 3 below, including English examples and filling out our paradigm for ideational structure.

The two central columns in Table 3 oppose non-recursive systems realised by non-iterative structures to recursive systems realised by iterative structures. This opposition is cross-classified by experiential as opposed to logical structure; logical structure is further classified as paratactic vs hypotactic, and within hypotactic structures are subclassified as progressive or regressive. The only structure type in the table not introduced above is non-iterative parataxis for which we suggest English correlative structures such as both…and, either…or, neither…nor (including perhaps the somewhat archaic the harder they come the harder they fall).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Table 1 was from Halliday (1965):

[2] To be clear, the authors' update of Halliday (1965) is limited to the three types of non-iterative logical structures and the iterative experiential structure.

The mistaken notion of a non-iterative logical structure arose from not understanding that a two-unit complex (duplex) is specified by selecting 'stop' on the first pass through a recursive system. Having first misapplied a subjacency duplex structure to submodification in a Pitjantjatjara nominal group, the authors then applied it to other structures in other languages without providing argument as to why it was appropriate to do so.

The mistaken notion of an iterative experiential structure arose from not understanding that 'multiple Epithets' at the rank of group are realised by iterative logical structures at the rank of word. The authors compounded this error by proposing that two types of structure obtain within the one experiential structure of a nominal group.

By way of comparison, the current SFL model of structure type by metafunction is given by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 85):

Misconstruing Adpositions As Structure Markers

Martin & Doran (2023: 41-2):

Our analysis raises issues about how far to extend subjacency duplex modelling in our descriptions. For adpositions this brings us in effect to the fuzzy boundary between participants and circumstances and the line drawn between structure markers on the one hand and prepositions or co-verbs on the other. The following excerpts from Halliday with Matthiessen (2014) flag the distinction as follows:

There is also one class of expressions with of, one of the few places where of functions as a full preposition (i.e. representing a minor process) as distinct from being merely a structure marker; for example, die of starvation. The corresponding WH- forms are why? or how?. (2014: 321)

The Medium is also the only element that is never introduced into the clause by means of a preposition (again with the same exception of medio-receptives); it is treated as something that always participates directly in the process. (Note that the structure the cooking of the rice, where the Medium follows of, is not an exception; of is functioning here, as it typically does, not as preposition but as structure marker – cf. genitive ‘s in the rice’s cooking.) (ibid. 341)

What appears to be taken as criterial here is whether or not of is simply positioning participants in transitivity structure or is specifying some kind of “circumstantial” meaning (e.g. “cause” in die of starvation; cf. die from starvation). For many languages the challenge here lies in drawing a line between peripheral participants (e.g. roles akin to English Recipients and Receivers) and Circumstances of Location — and their marking by the same adposition (e.g., English to, Tagalog sa, Korean e). In terms of this paper we are exploring how to draw a line between a subjacency duplex analysis (restricted perhaps to Recipients and Receivers in English) and a prepositional phrase analysis (restricted perhaps to Circumstances of Location in English).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, as previously demonstrated, the argument for interpreting submodification in a nominal group as a subjacency duplex structure was invalid and based on misunderstandings of theory. And no argument whatsoever has been proffered for the validity of applying the model to other structures.

[2] As previously demonstrated, because the authors misconstrue structure, the relationships between functions, as the functions themselves, they also misconstrue markers of those functions, adpositions, as structure markers. Because adpositions are not structure markers, they are irrelevant to the aims of the paper: a subjacency duplex analysis of structure markers.

[3] This misunderstands the quotes from Halliday & Matthiessen (2014). To be clear, their point is that the preposition of either functions as a 'full preposition', that is as a minor Process/Predicator, or it does not, in which case it functions as a structure marker that marks a relation between two nominal groups.

[4] Again, the perspective taken here by the Martin & Doran is the opposite of the perspective taken in SFL. That is, instead of identifying how meanings are expressed, the authors are concerned with identifying what expressions mean. For an SFL approach to these matters, see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 167-176) on degree of participanthood and degree of involvement.

Why Subjacency Duplexes Are Passed Over In Functional Grammar Descriptions

Martin & Doran (2023: 38):

As we can see, subjacency duplex analysis adds layers of structure to tables (or trees). This is inevitable if we strictly follow the principle that classes are realised by grammatical functions (such as α β# or #β α) and functions in turn by classes as we move from higher ranks to lower ones (shifting perspective back and forth between syntagm and structure as we go). This does present a problem, however, if we want to use our tables (or trees) to reflect grammatical complexity (Halliday 2008). Unlike serial complexing (the resource expanding the meaning potential of spoken language) or embedding (the resource expanding the meaning potential of written language), layers of subjacency structure do not reflect systemic choices of their own — they are part of the realisation of choices in other implicating systems. Put another way, they don’t add an extra layer of meaning to the structures with which they are involved. This is possibly why they are passed over in many functional grammar descriptions, especially where the goal is text analysis (following, for example, Halliday 1985 and its subsequent 1994 edition) rather than a comprehensive description.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. In SFL Theory, structures realise systems. In the authors' own model, subjacency duplexes are said to be logical structures that realise non-recursive systems, so this claim is even inconsistent with their own model. 

Importantly, the problem that the authors are trying to conceal here is that it is not possible to specify the entry condition for a system that specifies a subjacency duplex. This is because the entry conditions for grammatical systems are units on the rank scale, and, unlike all other complexes, a subjacency duplex is not the expansion of a rank unit, since a subjacency is not a rank unit.

[2] To be clear, if subjacency duplexes do not "add an extra layer of meaning", they do not serve any function, and so do not add any explanatory potential. In fact, as previous posts have demonstrated, a subjacency duplex analysis provides less explanatory potential than the original theory that the authors simply misunderstand.

[3] This is very misleading indeed. On the one hand, it sets up a false dichotomy: text analysis vs comprehensive description — one does not exclude the other — and on the other hand, it falsely claims that Halliday (1985; 1994) are not comprehensive descriptions.

To be clear, the reason why subjacency duplexes are "passed over" in all functional grammar descriptions not carried out by Martin and his former students, is that they only arise from misunderstandings of theory. These misunderstandings include taking the view from below, instead of the view from above, misunderstanding at which rank logical structures are located, not understanding recursive systems, not understanding iterative structures, mistaking adpositions for structure markers, and so on.

Some Of The Problems With Interpreting A Nominal Group "Focus" As A Subjacency Duplex

Martin & Doran (2023: 34):

Generalisation of subjacency structure for adpositions of all kinds opens up a host of possibilities. In (25) for example the Focus structure in (1) is reinterpreted along these lines, which obviates the need for an experiential Focus Marker function realised by of. This analysis more readily acknowledges that the of is not in fact a constituent of the embedded nominal group, but rather “modifies” it. It also opens the way for acknowledging that the of does not have the possibility for internal constituency itself (a regular feature of subjacency markers), unlike many of the other words within the group — that is, it acknowledges that the of is not in fact part of the experiential constituency hierarchy that underpins SFL’s notion of rank.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, adpositions are not structure markers, but markers of functions (clause roles); see Matthiessen (1995: 370). Because they are not structure markers, they are irrelevant to the concerns of the paper: interpreting structure markers in terms of subjacency duplexes.

[2] To be clear, 'Focus' is Martin's rebranding of Halliday's 'Facet'. It is a particularly poor rebranding, since it uses a textual distinction for an experiential construal, and because the term already has a place in the theory as the Focus of information.

[3] To be clear, here the authors have misinterpreted a genuine structure marker (of) as an adpositional function marker and reinterpreted the misinterpretation as a subjacency duplex. Importantly, the structure marker of is not a marker of one nominal group function, such as Facet, as demonstrated by all the nominal groups with this of where the Head and Thing conflate, as in the king of Bohemia.

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. To be clear, in SFL Theory, modification is a hypotactic relation of subcategorisation. Halliday (1985: 170):

for the purposes of the nominal group we need to take account of just one such relationship, that of subcategorisation: ‘a is a subset of x’. This has usually been referred to in the grammar of the nominal group as modification, so we will retain this more familiar term here.

Clearly, the preposition of does not subcategorise the nominal group the tops. Moreover, this analysis misinterprets a nominal group and the preposition of the following prepositional phrase as a two-unit complex (duplex).

[5] This is a very serious misunderstanding of the ranked constituency of SFL Theory. On the one hand, the word of is monomorphemic: it consists of one morpheme; that is its 'internal constituency'. On the other hand, the ranked constituency hierarchy is a model of form, not experiential meaning. What is true is that the type of structure favoured by the experiential metafunction, segmental, is based on constituency (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 85).

[6] To be clear, all the constituents of this nominal group are accounted for by the logical analysis:

However, the authors' problem is, again, methodological: instead of starting with function (Value) and asking how it is realised in form (Token), they start with form (Token) and ask what function (Value) it realises. In this case, instead of starting with the Facet and asking how it is realised, they start with a preposition and ask what function it realises.

On the basis of Halliday's editions of IFG (1985, 1994), the multivariate analysis of this nominal group is:

Misapplying Subjacency Duplexes To Adpositions Misunderstood As Structure Markers [1]

Martin & Doran (2023: 32-3):

Recognition of subjacency duplexes opens up the possibility of a logical alternative to the experiential analysis of adpositions discussed in Section 2. Examples (2) and (3) are reworked as (19) and (20) below. Here participants in clause structure are analysed as being realised by subjacency duplexes, with progressive (α β#) or regressive (#β α) structures as appropriate; their α is realised by a nominal group and their β by the relevant clitic.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, subjacency duplexes were said to be motivated by relations within nominal group structure, but here they are applied to a relation between a nominal group and an adposition. 

Importantly, these adpositions are not structure markers, but markers of functions (clause roles); see Matthiessen (1995: 370). Because they are not structure markers, they are irrelevant to the concerns of the paper: interpreting structure markers in terms of subjacency duplexes.

[2] To be clear, applying existing SFL theory, the participants in (19) and (20) are each realised by an adpositional phrase consisting of a nominal group and an adposition, on the model of a prepositional phrase:

Cf Matthiessen (1995: 370):

In summary, Martin & Doran have merely rebranded an adpositional phrase as a subjacency duplex.

Nevertheless, the question is — even ignoring all the misunderstandings involved — what explanatory advantage does the subjacency duplex analysis have over existing SFL theory?

Misunderstanding The Logical Structure Of The Nominal Group

Martin & Doran (2023: 31-2):

By way of illustrating this logical notation, we can compare the α β# of the Pitjantjatjara subjacent duplex Example (17) above, with the serial hypotactic grading in English in (18):

Blogger Comments:

[1]  To be clear, (17) is intended to demonstrate a non-iterative logical structure, but it fails to provide the full logical structure of the nominal group. Moreover, the structure claimed to be a subjacency duplex is simply the Sub-Head and Sub-Modifier of the ɣ Modifier:

[2] To be clear, (18) confirms that the authors do not understand the logical structure of a nominal group, since they omit all the logical structure above the level of submodification:

Cf. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 390):

Misconstruing Word Rank Iterative Logical Structures As Group Rank (i) Iterative Experiential Structures And (ii) Non-Iterative Logical Structures

Martin & Doran (2023: 31):

The discussion in this section indicates that we need to loosen up the association of experiential and logical meaning with specific types of system and structure – as outlined in Table 2 (setting aside paratactic complexing to simplify the discussion here). 

For experiential meaning the table draws on the contrast in English between a Deictic Numerative Thing structure for which non-recursive systems insert each function once and Epithet Thing Qualifier structures for which recursive systems allow for multiple Epithets and Qualifiers independently modifying the Thing (notated with an “ⁿ” superscript below). 

For logical meaning the table contrasts duplexes deriving from non-recursive systems with series deriving from recursive ones (e.g. the contrast between Pitjantjatjara and English, for example, as far as grading is concerned). The notation allows for both progressive and regressive duplexes and series (i.e. “left-headed” α β… vs “right-headed” β α dependency structures). And duplexes are distinguished from series by marking their culminative dependent β element with “#”.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As previously demonstrated, the authors' notion of a non-recursive system and non-iterative structure for a logical structure is based on their misunderstanding of the nature of recursive systems and the iterative structures that realise them. And the authors' notion of a recursive system and iterative structure for experiential structure is based on mistaking recursive systems and iterative structures of the logical metafunction at word rank for recursive systems and iterative structures of the experiential metafunction at group rank.

That is, what the authors presented as a non-iterative logical structure at group rank was an iterative logical structure at word rank: a two-unit hypotactic word complex. And what the authors presented as an iterative experiential structure at group rank was actually an iterative logical structure at word rank: a hypotactic word complex realising an Epithet.

[2] As previously explained, here the authors misconstrue the word rank iterative logical structures that can realise elements of group structure as iterative experiential structures at group rank. But here they also create theoretical inconsistency by proposing different structural types obtaining between different elements of the same unit. 

[3] As previously explained, here the authors misconstrue the word rank iterative logical structure that realises a submodified Epithet as a group rank non-iterative structure. But here they also create theoretical inconsistency by proposing different logical structural types obtaining between different experiential elements of the same unit.

[4] To be clear, Matthiessen (1995: 600-2) proposes a textual system of CULMINATION, at clause rank, as a written mode analogue of spoken mode INFORMATION. The authors, however, just use 'culminative' to mean 'final', without any acknowledgement of Matthiessen.

Misunderstanding Recursive Systems

Martin & Doran (2023: 30-1):

What about the link between “logical” systems and iterative structures?

Rose (2001, 2021) presents overviews of logical resources in Western Desert (Pitjantjatjara), taking into account the possibility of what he calls simplexes, duplexes and series – with the choice of series leading to a recursive system realised by iterative structure. For nominal group choices, he notes that the series option is not available for grading within Epithets. So an adjective can be graded once, but we do not find series such as very much more difficult. An example of a grading duplex is presented in (17), adapted from Rose (2021:70).

Rose (2021) further reports that paratactic series are possible for Pitjantjatjara groups and words in general, but that hypotactic relations at these ranks (and certain choices at clause rank) are restricted to duplexes – in orbital terms a head and just one dependent satellite. His work thus documents the possibility of logical systems realised by non-iterative structures.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, even Rose (2001: 368) acknowledges that he took the terms 'simplex' and 'duplex' from Matthiessen (1995).

[2] To be clear, this misunderstands the basic nature of a recursive system. A recursive system is one which provides the option of re-entering the same system.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438) provide an example:

In the case of a simplex, a single rank unit, the RECURSION system is not entered, because the system is a means of specifying iterative structures (complexes). In the case of a duplex, a two-unit complex, the feature 'stop' is selected (along with the other features that specify the tactic and logico-semantic relations of the complex). In the case of a "series", a complex of three or more units, the feature 'go on' is selected, and the system is re-entered, and either 'stop' or 'go on' is then selected, depending on how many units in the complex.

[3] To be clear, the 'grading within Epithets' is realised by a two-unit word complex, an iterative structure realising a recursive system at word rank. In this case, the recursive system is entered, and the feature 'stop' is selected, as explained above.

[4] To be clear, Rose's 'grading duplex' is simply the word complex that realises the submodification in the nominal group:

[5] To be clear, Martin proposes orbital structure as experiential, but here the authors have used it to describe a hypotactic logical structure. As previously observed, Martin's orbital structure misconstrues multivariate experiential structure as hypotactic logical structure. Here the authors reveal that misunderstanding themselves.

[6] This is misleading, because it is not true. Rose's work does not document the possibility of logical systems realised by non-iterative structures, because it presents an iterative structure, a two-unit word complex, that realises a recursive system, as demonstrated above.

Misunderstanding Iterative Structures

Martin & Doran (2023: 23):

This complementarity means that there are two ways in which a given structure can be extended. For multivariate structure the relevant process is embedding as an element of structure is realised by an element of the same or higher rank (a process originally referred to as rankshift). This kind of extension was exemplified by the embedded nominal group in (1) above and the embedded clauses in (6), (7) and (8). For univariate structure on the other hand the relevant process is iteration – as an element of structure is repeated an indefinite number of times.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, rankshift involves a rank unit, not an element of function structure, operating at a lower rank, as when a clause is shifted to the rank of word to serve as an element (Qualifier) of nominal group structure.

[2] To be clear, 'iteration' was not discussed in the authors' source: Halliday (1965). It first appears in IFG in the second edition (1994).

[3] To be clear, because a structure consists of relationships between elements, not the elements themselves, an iterative structure means that it is a relationship that is iterated, not an element. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451):

A univariate structure is an iteration of the same functional relationship: for example ‘and’ as in Bill Brewer, Jan Stewer, Peter Gurney, Peter Davy, Dan’l Whiddon, Harry Hawk, Old Uncle Tom Cobbley and all; ‘equals’ as in Tom, Tom, the piper’s son (Tom = Tom = the piper’s son); ‘is a subset of’ as in new-fashioned three-cornered cambric country-cut handkerchief (what kind of handkerchief? – country-cut; what kind of country-cut handkerchief? – cambric, ... ); and so on. Such iterative structures are unique to the logical mode of meaning; they are, as noted, formed out of logico-semantic relations.

The authors' misunderstanding of structure as its functional elements is one of several factors that undermines the validity of the argumentation in this paper.

Summary Of Section On Adpositions

Martin & Doran (2023: 22, 17):

In this section two difficulties with an experiential analysis of structure marking adpositions have been reviewed – arising from the relation of these structure markers to nominal group complexes and embedded clauses. By way of working towards an alternative analysis working around these problems we need to step back and reconsider work on types of structure in SFL. In particular we need to focus on the complementarity of experiential and logical meaning, a complementarity passed over briefly above in relation to the tiers of experiential and logical structure proposed by Halliday with Matthiessen (2014) in Figure1.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this section of this paper on structure markers was concerned with adpositions, which are not structure markers, and so are irrelevant to the concerns of the paper. The misunderstanding arises from mistaking functions, elements of structure, for structures, the relations between functions, as previously explained. The adpositions discussed were all lower rank markers of clause rank transitivity functions.

[2] To be clear, the two problems arose because the authors attempted to interpret adpositions as constituents of nominal groups, nominal group complexes and embedded clauses, instead proposing a phrase that consists of an adposition and a nominal group, nominal group complex or embedded clause. So, on the one hand, there are no problems in this regard, and on the other hand, the non-problems are irrelevant to the concerns of the paper: structure markers.

Misconstruing Another Adposition As A Structure Marker

Martin & Doran (2023: 22):

The same issue arises in Tagalog. In (8) the embedded clause dahan-dahang lumapit sa kanya ‘very slowly approached him’ functions as Value (and Theme) in a relational identifying clause — as marked by ang (a relatively literal English translation would run along the lines of ‘a weak flicker of light was what slowly approached him’).

Aside from this structure marker there is nothing to indicate that this clause is embedded (contrast the nominalisation pag-kislap ‘flicker’ in the nominal group realising the Token, with its nominalising prefix pag-). The clause dahan-dahang lumapit sa kanya can in fact function perfectly well as a ranking clause enacting a negotiable move in an exchange. 

So once again we either have to suggest that Tagalog adpositions are elements of both embedded clause and nominal group structure – or alternatively insist that dahan-dahang lumapit sa kanya is embedded as Thing. Additional argumentation for the latter analysis would be very challenging to provide since there is nothing motivating the analysis of this clause as a nominal group other than the pre-preposition.

Blogger Comments:

[1] See the previous post.

[2] To be clear, since ang marks an element as Value and Theme, it is not a structure marker, but is, like previous adpositions, a marker of clause functions. As previously pointed out, because adpositions are not structure markers, they are irrelevant to the concerns of this paper.

[3] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, this instance demonstrates that a clause rank function is realised by an adposition plus an embedded clause. This does not logically entail that the adposition is an element of the structure of the embedded clause (or a nominal group). As previously mentioned, the two can be interpreted as joint constituents of a phrase.

[4] To be clear, the clause is shifted to word rank where it serves as the Head/Thing of a nominal group.

[5] In SFL Theory, argumentation is made from above: how meanings are expressed. Here the authors take the opposite perspective: looking for formal evidence for distinguishing expressions of meaning (clause vs nominal group).

Misunderstanding Rankshift

Martin & Doran (2023: 21):

Alternatively we could argue that such embedded nominal groups are in fact embedded as a function in a nominal group realising the Phenomenon, as outlined in (7). This is a considerable complication of the analysis, for which additional argumentation would have to be provided. It is not clear for example which group function the embedded clause is realising (we somewhat arbitrarily chose Thing below). This analysis also misses the point that an embedded clause has in fact been chosen instead of a nominal group, not within a nominal group.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, from the perspective of SFL Theory, the Phenomenon (macrophenomenon) of this clause is realised by an embedded clause, translated as losing to others, whose circumstantial Adjunct is realised by a postpositional phrase consisting of a nominal group nam (others) and a postposition hante (to).

[2] To be clear, an embedded clause in a nominal group serves as either Postmodifier/Qualifier or Head/Thing. In this instance, it serves as the Head/Thing; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 492).

[3] This misunderstands rankshift. In this instance, a clause has been rankshifted to function as an element of nominal group structure. Because elements of group structure are realised by words, the clause has shifted to word rank.

Here again, the authors are taking the perspective of form (clause and group) instead of the SFL view of function.

Misunderstanding The Function Of The Structure Marker 'Of'

Martin & Doran (2023: 16-7):

A representative description from Halliday with Matthiessen (2014) is provided as Figure 1 below.¹ Note that neither the experiential nor logical tier of analysis provides a specific function label for of.

¹ The experiential label Qualifier on the logical tier, where a Post-Modifier function might be expected, is surprising, as is the absence of a post- α β function below (for of the hills); however, these labelling issues are not directly relevant to the paper and so will be set aside here.

 Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the reason why no function label for of is that does not serve as a functional element in the nominal group. Instead, it marks a relation between nominal groups (the tops and the hills).

[2] Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 396):

[3] To be clear, the "surprising" use of 'Qualifier' instead of 'Postmodifier' in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014) is simply a typographical error, as a quick glance at the surrounding text makes clear.

[4] To be clear, the Postmodifier is not labelled as a dependent element for reasons explained by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 390, 392n):

But the Postmodifier does not itself enter into the logical structure, because it is not construed as a word complex. What the logical analysis does is to bring out the hypotactic basis of premodification in the nominal group…

In the first two editions of IFG, the Postmodifier also was brought into the scope of the logical representation. But this appears to complicate the description without adding further to its explanatory power.

Misunderstanding Structure Markers

 Martin & Doran (2023: 16):

1. Structure markers 

In  systemic functional linguistics (hereafter SFL) Halliday’s description of English grammar (1985  and subsequent editions) is generally taken as a benchmark,  proposing as it does rich functional descriptions of clauses, groups and phrases. In the fourth edition (2014) a number of references are made to what are termed “structure markers” – with reference to of in nominal groups, to in verbal groups and conjunctive binders (e.g. that, which, whether, if; when, because, if, although) and linkers (e.g. and, or, but, so). Of these, binders and linkers are treated as structural Themes but otherwise analyses with distinct function labels for structure markers are not provided.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading. To be clear, the reason why Halliday's description is 'taken as a benchmark' is that SFL is a theory devised by Halliday. Without Halliday, there is no SFL; without everyone else, there is.

[2] To be clear, on the one hand, the perspective taken here by the Martin & Doran is the opposite of the perspective taken in SFL. That is, instead of identifying how meanings are expressed, the authors are concerned with identifying what expressions mean.

On the other hand, the authors here disclose their misunderstanding of the SFL notion of structure. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451) make clear: 

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

Because a structure consists of relations, a structure marker marks a relation. For example, of marks a relation between nominal groups, while binders and linkers mark tactic relations between rank units.

The reason why binders and linkers are also treated as structural Themes is that they also serve as these functional elements in clause structure. The reason why the structure marker of is not assigned a function label is that it does not serve as a functional element in nominal group structure.

This fundamental misunderstanding of structure forms the basis of this paper.

Abstract

Martin & Doran (2023: 1):

Structure markers 

A subjacency duplex analysis 

J.R.Martin & Y.J.Doran The University of Sydney, Australia|Australian Catholic University, Australia 

In this paper we revisit the association of types of structure with modes of meaning in systemic functional linguistics (SFL). Focusing mainly on nominal group grammar, we argue that the association of experiential structure with non-recursive systems realised by multivariate structures and logical structure with recursive systems realised by univariate structures needs to be relaxed – in recognition of dependency structures consisting of two elements in a head/dependent relation. We refer to such structures as subjacency duplexes and explore their potential for the analysis of what are often dismissed in SFL as structure markers – adpositions, linkers and binders in particular. 

Keywords: subjacency duplex, types of structure, structure marker, logical metafunction, recursion, nominal groups

Blogger Comments:

It will be seen, in the course of this review, that the notion of a 'subjacency duplex' is theoretically invalid, partly due to the fact that the authors, Martin & Doran, misunderstand both the SFL mode of theorising and the SFL notion of structure, the latter entailing the misunderstanding of the notion of 'structure marker'.

In terms of understanding the mode of theorising, SFL is concerned with identifying how meanings are expressed. Halliday (1985: xiv):

In this paper, however, the authors are concerned with the 'syntax' approach: identifying what expressions mean. That is, the SFL method is to encode meaning (Value) by reference to expression (Token), but the authors' method is to decode expression (Token) by reference to meaning (Value).

In terms of understanding structure, SFL construes structure as the relations between functional elements. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451) make clear: 

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

In this paper, however, the authors misconstrue structure as the functional elements themselves. This leads them to misunderstand iterative structures as iterated elements, rather than as an iterated relation, and to misunderstand markers of functions, adpositions, as structure markers.