A Summary of The Problems That Invalidate The Authors' Model Of Ideational Structure

Martin & Doran (2023: 44, 45):

By way of summarising our discussion we extend Table 1 above as Table 3 below, including English examples and filling out our paradigm for ideational structure.

The two central columns in Table 3 oppose non-recursive systems realised by non-iterative structures to recursive systems realised by iterative structures. This opposition is cross-classified by experiential as opposed to logical structure; logical structure is further classified as paratactic vs hypotactic, and within hypotactic structures are subclassified as progressive or regressive. The only structure type in the table not introduced above is non-iterative parataxis for which we suggest English correlative structures such as both…and, either…or, neither…nor (including perhaps the somewhat archaic the harder they come the harder they fall).

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Table 1 was from Halliday (1965):

[2] To be clear, the authors' update of Halliday (1965) is limited to the three types of non-iterative logical structures and the iterative experiential structure.

The mistaken notion of a non-iterative logical structure arose from not understanding that a two-unit complex (duplex) is specified by selecting 'stop' on the first pass through a recursive system. Having first misapplied a subjacency duplex structure to submodification in a Pitjantjatjara nominal group, the authors then applied it to other structures in other languages without providing argument as to why it was appropriate to do so.

The mistaken notion of an iterative experiential structure arose from not understanding that 'multiple Epithets' at the rank of group are realised by iterative logical structures at the rank of word. The authors compounded this error by proposing that two types of structure obtain within the one experiential structure of a nominal group.

By way of comparison, the current SFL model of structure type by metafunction is given by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 85):

Confusing Group Rank With Word Rank

Martin & Doran (2023: 39, 40):

To this point in our discussion we have focused on structure, without looking carefully at the systems from which our structures derive. One systemic implication arising has to do with the need to distinguish two different types of recursive system — namely recursive systems giving rise to serial logical structures (whether paratactic or hypotactic) as opposed to recursive systems giving rise to iterating elements of experiential structure. 

For English EPITHESIS for example we need to distinguish between systems underpinning indefinitely extendable regressive grading complexes (a not much more glorious history) and systems underpinning multiple Epithets (their long glorious well-documented history). 

One possibility would be to retain standard SFL recursive system notation for paratactic and hypotactic series (e.g. the grading system in Figure 4 to generate not much more glorious history) and use an ‘ⁿ’ superscript on the relevant feature for experiential iteration (e.g. the [describedⁿ] option in Figure 4 to generate long glorious well-documented history). 

Formulated along these lines Figure 4 thus includes one non-recursive DEIXIS system (from which a single Deictic function can be derived), one recursive EPITHESIS system (from which multiple Epithets can be derived) and one recursive GRADING system (from which a hypotactic series can be derived).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously demonstrated, the recursive systems that specify these iterative structures are at word rank, not group rank, and the structures are logical, word complexes, not experiential.

[2] To be clear, Figure 4 confuses systems at group rank that specify multivariate structures, with the systems at word rank that specify the univariate structures that realise submodification at group rank.

On The Representation Of Subjacency Duplex Structure

Martin & Doran (2023: 38-9):

One way to simplify tables (or trees) incorporating subjacency duplex structure would be to relax the ‘function realised by class’ requirement and allow duplex structures to directly realise grammatical functions.⁹ Example (32) is revised along these lines as (33) below. This is a more economical analysis for publication purposes, but would need to be seen as a simplification. 

⁹ SFL’s expanded realisation statement operator (Matthiessen and Halliday 2009: 98) sets a precedent in this regard, although managing a completely different type of phenomenon (e.g. expansion of the English Mood function as Subject and Finite).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the revision of (32) as (33) is simply the removal of the words 'subjacency duplex'. A simpler solution, if the notion of 'subjacency duplex' had any validity, would be to provide different representations of structure for each rank, clause and group, as in Halliday ± Matthiessen (1985, 1994, 2004, 2014).

[2] To be clear, this realisation statement is concerned with layering functions such as Mood element as Subject and Finite. It is not concerned with layering what the authors consider to be form (subjacency duplex) and function (#β α).

Why Subjacency Duplexes Are Passed Over In Functional Grammar Descriptions

Martin & Doran (2023: 38):

As we can see, subjacency duplex analysis adds layers of structure to tables (or trees). This is inevitable if we strictly follow the principle that classes are realised by grammatical functions (such as α β# or #β α) and functions in turn by classes as we move from higher ranks to lower ones (shifting perspective back and forth between syntagm and structure as we go). This does present a problem, however, if we want to use our tables (or trees) to reflect grammatical complexity (Halliday 2008). Unlike serial complexing (the resource expanding the meaning potential of spoken language) or embedding (the resource expanding the meaning potential of written language), layers of subjacency structure do not reflect systemic choices of their own — they are part of the realisation of choices in other implicating systems. Put another way, they don’t add an extra layer of meaning to the structures with which they are involved. This is possibly why they are passed over in many functional grammar descriptions, especially where the goal is text analysis (following, for example, Halliday 1985 and its subsequent 1994 edition) rather than a comprehensive description.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. In SFL Theory, structures realise systems. In the authors' own model, subjacency duplexes are said to be logical structures that realise non-recursive systems, so this claim is even inconsistent with their own model. 

Importantly, the problem that the authors are trying to conceal here is that it is not possible to specify the entry condition for a system that specifies a subjacency duplex. This is because the entry conditions for grammatical systems are units on the rank scale, and, unlike all other complexes, a subjacency duplex is not the expansion of a rank unit, since a subjacency is not a rank unit.

[2] To be clear, if subjacency duplexes do not "add an extra layer of meaning", they do not serve any function, and so do not add any explanatory potential. In fact, as previous posts have demonstrated, a subjacency duplex analysis provides less explanatory potential than the original theory that the authors simply misunderstand.

[3] This is very misleading indeed. On the one hand, it sets up a false dichotomy: text analysis vs comprehensive description — one does not exclude the other — and on the other hand, it falsely claims that Halliday (1985; 1994) are not comprehensive descriptions.

To be clear, the reason why subjacency duplexes are "passed over" in all functional grammar descriptions not carried out by Martin and his former students, is that they only arise from misunderstandings of theory. These misunderstandings include taking the view from below, instead of the view from above, misunderstanding at which rank logical structures are located, not understanding recursive systems, not understanding iterative structures, mistaking adpositions for structure markers, and so on.

Misconstruing Word Rank Iterative Logical Structures As Group Rank (i) Iterative Experiential Structures And (ii) Non-Iterative Logical Structures

Martin & Doran (2023: 31):

The discussion in this section indicates that we need to loosen up the association of experiential and logical meaning with specific types of system and structure – as outlined in Table 2 (setting aside paratactic complexing to simplify the discussion here). 

For experiential meaning the table draws on the contrast in English between a Deictic Numerative Thing structure for which non-recursive systems insert each function once and Epithet Thing Qualifier structures for which recursive systems allow for multiple Epithets and Qualifiers independently modifying the Thing (notated with an “ⁿ” superscript below). 

For logical meaning the table contrasts duplexes deriving from non-recursive systems with series deriving from recursive ones (e.g. the contrast between Pitjantjatjara and English, for example, as far as grading is concerned). The notation allows for both progressive and regressive duplexes and series (i.e. “left-headed” α β… vs “right-headed” β α dependency structures). And duplexes are distinguished from series by marking their culminative dependent β element with “#”.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As previously demonstrated, the authors' notion of a non-recursive system and non-iterative structure for a logical structure is based on their misunderstanding of the nature of recursive systems and the iterative structures that realise them. And the authors' notion of a recursive system and iterative structure for experiential structure is based on mistaking recursive systems and iterative structures of the logical metafunction at word rank for recursive systems and iterative structures of the experiential metafunction at group rank.

That is, what the authors presented as a non-iterative logical structure at group rank was an iterative logical structure at word rank: a two-unit hypotactic word complex. And what the authors presented as an iterative experiential structure at group rank was actually an iterative logical structure at word rank: a hypotactic word complex realising an Epithet.

[2] As previously explained, here the authors misconstrue the word rank iterative logical structures that can realise elements of group structure as iterative experiential structures at group rank. But here they also create theoretical inconsistency by proposing different structural types obtaining between different elements of the same unit. 

[3] As previously explained, here the authors misconstrue the word rank iterative logical structure that realises a submodified Epithet as a group rank non-iterative structure. But here they also create theoretical inconsistency by proposing different logical structural types obtaining between different experiential elements of the same unit.

[4] To be clear, Matthiessen (1995: 600-2) proposes a textual system of CULMINATION, at clause rank, as a written mode analogue of spoken mode INFORMATION. The authors, however, just use 'culminative' to mean 'final', without any acknowledgement of Matthiessen.