"Granting These Structural Orphans A Home"

Martin & Doran (2023: 44):

Structure markers make important contributions to the realisation of systemic options in many languages, though in some (such as those with adpositions at group rank) more than others (such as those where inflectional morphology carries a heavy load). And there are many cases, some reviewed above (e.g. nominal group complexes and embedded clauses in Korean and Tagalog), where structure markers make explicit what goes with what and cannot be ignored. Our goal here has been to suggest a way forward for grammarians disposed towards granting these structural orphans a home.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, adpositions (and inflectional morphemes) do not function as structure markers. Instead, they mark functions in structures. To be clear, SFL construes structure as the relations between functional elements. As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 451) make clear: 

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

A structure marker, in this view, is a marker of relations, not of functional roles. Because adpositions are not structure markers, they are irrelevant to the aims of the paper: a subjacency duplex analysis of structure markers.

[2] To be clear, genuine structure markers mark relations between elements. For example, linkers mark paradigmatic relations and binders mark hypotactic relations, but this is already theorised in SFL Theory (e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 453, 611), so any suggestion that these functions have been ignored or not been made explicit before this paper by the authors is misleading.

[3] To be clear, the authors end their paper, as they began, with a logical fallacy: presenting lexical metaphors that position the reasoned invalidation of their model as an immoral act. This is the fallacy known as an Appeal to pity (argumentum ad misericordiam): generating feelings of sympathy or mercy in the listener to obtain common agreement. The sentiment might be summarised as "Make Structure Markers Great Again."

Why Subjacency Duplexes Are Passed Over In Functional Grammar Descriptions

Martin & Doran (2023: 38):

As we can see, subjacency duplex analysis adds layers of structure to tables (or trees). This is inevitable if we strictly follow the principle that classes are realised by grammatical functions (such as α β# or #β α) and functions in turn by classes as we move from higher ranks to lower ones (shifting perspective back and forth between syntagm and structure as we go). This does present a problem, however, if we want to use our tables (or trees) to reflect grammatical complexity (Halliday 2008). Unlike serial complexing (the resource expanding the meaning potential of spoken language) or embedding (the resource expanding the meaning potential of written language), layers of subjacency structure do not reflect systemic choices of their own — they are part of the realisation of choices in other implicating systems. Put another way, they don’t add an extra layer of meaning to the structures with which they are involved. This is possibly why they are passed over in many functional grammar descriptions, especially where the goal is text analysis (following, for example, Halliday 1985 and its subsequent 1994 edition) rather than a comprehensive description.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. In SFL Theory, structures realise systems. In the authors' own model, subjacency duplexes are said to be logical structures that realise non-recursive systems, so this claim is even inconsistent with their own model. 

Importantly, the problem that the authors are trying to conceal here is that it is not possible to specify the entry condition for a system that specifies a subjacency duplex. This is because the entry conditions for grammatical systems are units on the rank scale, and, unlike all other complexes, a subjacency duplex is not the expansion of a rank unit, since a subjacency is not a rank unit.

[2] To be clear, if subjacency duplexes do not "add an extra layer of meaning", they do not serve any function, and so do not add any explanatory potential. In fact, as previous posts have demonstrated, a subjacency duplex analysis provides less explanatory potential than the original theory that the authors simply misunderstand.

[3] This is very misleading indeed. On the one hand, it sets up a false dichotomy: text analysis vs comprehensive description — one does not exclude the other — and on the other hand, it falsely claims that Halliday (1985; 1994) are not comprehensive descriptions.

To be clear, the reason why subjacency duplexes are "passed over" in all functional grammar descriptions not carried out by Martin and his former students, is that they only arise from misunderstandings of theory. These misunderstandings include taking the view from below, instead of the view from above, misunderstanding at which rank logical structures are located, not understanding recursive systems, not understanding iterative structures, mistaking adpositions for structure markers, and so on.

Misapplying A Subjacency Duplex Analysis To A Spanish Nominal Group

Martin & Doran (2023: 36-7):

Comparable linkers are found across languages. In Spanish Classifiers realised by nouns following the Thing function are most commonly prefaced by de (Quiroz and Martin 2021).⁸

⁸ A possible alternative analysis treating de ruedas in (29) as a prepositional phrase is not tenable since (i) de is a structure marker, not a preposition (i.e. there are no “circumstantial” meanings implicated) and (ii) ruedas ‘wheels’ cannot be expanded as a nominal group (Martin et al. 2023). It should be noted that Quiroz, Martin’s mentor as far as Spanish grammar is concerned, does not subscribe to this subjacency analysis (as reflected in Quiroz and Martin 2021).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, subjacency duplexes were (spuriously) proposed as a means of modelling limited submodification in a nominal group. No argument has been provided as to why they are appropriate to model structure markers.

[2] To be clear, silla  and ruedas are both nouns, so the function of de is mark a relation between nominal groups, like English of. It is not a linker because it does not mark a paratactic relation.

The literal translation of this nominal group is 'chair of wheels', so in the translation at least, the structure is Head + Postmodifier. That is, the subjacency duplex is just a rebranding of what would be a prepositional phrase serving as Postmodifier in English. But significantly, this is a compound noun in English.

But, more importantly, the combination [de + nominal group], like all prepositional phrases, is not a hypotactic two-unit complex (duplex) because de does not modify (subcategorise) the nominal group.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. Spanish de is a preposition that serves as a structure marker. As a preposition, it forms a prepositional phrase with the nominal group that follows. Here the authors have confused form (prepositional phrase), with function (circumstance).

[4] To be clear, this suggests that the nominal group has similar properties to compound nouns, like English wheelchair.

[5] This review is demonstrating that Quiroz 'made the right call' in this regard.

Some Of The Problems With Interpreting A Nominal Group "Focus" As A Subjacency Duplex

Martin & Doran (2023: 34):

Generalisation of subjacency structure for adpositions of all kinds opens up a host of possibilities. In (25) for example the Focus structure in (1) is reinterpreted along these lines, which obviates the need for an experiential Focus Marker function realised by of. This analysis more readily acknowledges that the of is not in fact a constituent of the embedded nominal group, but rather “modifies” it. It also opens the way for acknowledging that the of does not have the possibility for internal constituency itself (a regular feature of subjacency markers), unlike many of the other words within the group — that is, it acknowledges that the of is not in fact part of the experiential constituency hierarchy that underpins SFL’s notion of rank.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, adpositions are not structure markers, but markers of functions (clause roles); see Matthiessen (1995: 370). Because they are not structure markers, they are irrelevant to the concerns of the paper: interpreting structure markers in terms of subjacency duplexes.

[2] To be clear, 'Focus' is Martin's rebranding of Halliday's 'Facet'. It is a particularly poor rebranding, since it uses a textual distinction for an experiential construal, and because the term already has a place in the theory as the Focus of information.

[3] To be clear, here the authors have misinterpreted a genuine structure marker (of) as an adpositional function marker and reinterpreted the misinterpretation as a subjacency duplex. Importantly, the structure marker of is not a marker of one nominal group function, such as Facet, as demonstrated by all the nominal groups with this of where the Head and Thing conflate, as in the king of Bohemia.

[4] This is misleading, because it is not true. To be clear, in SFL Theory, modification is a hypotactic relation of subcategorisation. Halliday (1985: 170):

for the purposes of the nominal group we need to take account of just one such relationship, that of subcategorisation: ‘a is a subset of x’. This has usually been referred to in the grammar of the nominal group as modification, so we will retain this more familiar term here.

Clearly, the preposition of does not subcategorise the nominal group the tops. Moreover, this analysis misinterprets a nominal group and the preposition of the following prepositional phrase as a two-unit complex (duplex).

[5] This is a very serious misunderstanding of the ranked constituency of SFL Theory. On the one hand, the word of is monomorphemic: it consists of one morpheme; that is its 'internal constituency'. On the other hand, the ranked constituency hierarchy is a model of form, not experiential meaning. What is true is that the type of structure favoured by the experiential metafunction, segmental, is based on constituency (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 85).

[6] To be clear, all the constituents of this nominal group are accounted for by the logical analysis:

However, the authors' problem is, again, methodological: instead of starting with function (Value) and asking how it is realised in form (Token), they start with form (Token) and ask what function (Value) it realises. In this case, instead of starting with the Facet and asking how it is realised, they start with a preposition and ask what function it realises.

On the basis of Halliday's editions of IFG (1985, 1994), the multivariate analysis of this nominal group is:

Misapplying Subjacency Duplexes To Adpositions Misunderstood As Structure Markers [2]

Martin & Doran (2023: 33):

Examples (4) and (5) above presented the problem of group complexes sharing the same adposition. The relevant parts of these are reworked as (21) and (22) below. The analysis below the subjacency duplex makes it clear that both elements of the nominal group complex play the same role in clause structure.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, there is no problem here. The adposition marks a clause rank function, and in these cases the function is realised by a nominal group complex. The reason why the authors mistakenly think this to be a problem is methodological: instead of starting with function (Value) and asking how it is realised in form (Token), they start with form (Token) and ask what function (Value) it realises.

Again, these adpositions are not structure markers, but markers of functions (clause roles); see Matthiessen (1995: 370). Because they are not structure markers, they are irrelevant to the concerns of the paper: interpreting structure markers in terms of subjacency duplexes.

[2] To be clear, applying existing SFL theory, the participants in (21) and (22) are each realised by an adpositional phrase consisting of a nominal group complex and an adposition, on the model of a prepositional phrase:

Again, Martin & Doran have merely rebranded an adpositional phrase as a subjacency duplex.

[3] This is misleading. A subjacency duplex is not necessary to show that the clause role is served by a nominal group complex.

Misconstruing Word Rank Iterative Logical Structures As Group Rank (i) Iterative Experiential Structures And (ii) Non-Iterative Logical Structures

Martin & Doran (2023: 31):

The discussion in this section indicates that we need to loosen up the association of experiential and logical meaning with specific types of system and structure – as outlined in Table 2 (setting aside paratactic complexing to simplify the discussion here). 

For experiential meaning the table draws on the contrast in English between a Deictic Numerative Thing structure for which non-recursive systems insert each function once and Epithet Thing Qualifier structures for which recursive systems allow for multiple Epithets and Qualifiers independently modifying the Thing (notated with an “ⁿ” superscript below). 

For logical meaning the table contrasts duplexes deriving from non-recursive systems with series deriving from recursive ones (e.g. the contrast between Pitjantjatjara and English, for example, as far as grading is concerned). The notation allows for both progressive and regressive duplexes and series (i.e. “left-headed” α β… vs “right-headed” β α dependency structures). And duplexes are distinguished from series by marking their culminative dependent β element with “#”.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is untrue. As previously demonstrated, the authors' notion of a non-recursive system and non-iterative structure for a logical structure is based on their misunderstanding of the nature of recursive systems and the iterative structures that realise them. And the authors' notion of a recursive system and iterative structure for experiential structure is based on mistaking recursive systems and iterative structures of the logical metafunction at word rank for recursive systems and iterative structures of the experiential metafunction at group rank.

That is, what the authors presented as a non-iterative logical structure at group rank was an iterative logical structure at word rank: a two-unit hypotactic word complex. And what the authors presented as an iterative experiential structure at group rank was actually an iterative logical structure at word rank: a hypotactic word complex realising an Epithet.

[2] As previously explained, here the authors misconstrue the word rank iterative logical structures that can realise elements of group structure as iterative experiential structures at group rank. But here they also create theoretical inconsistency by proposing different structural types obtaining between different elements of the same unit. 

[3] As previously explained, here the authors misconstrue the word rank iterative logical structure that realises a submodified Epithet as a group rank non-iterative structure. But here they also create theoretical inconsistency by proposing different logical structural types obtaining between different experiential elements of the same unit.

[4] To be clear, Matthiessen (1995: 600-2) proposes a textual system of CULMINATION, at clause rank, as a written mode analogue of spoken mode INFORMATION. The authors, however, just use 'culminative' to mean 'final', without any acknowledgement of Matthiessen.

Misunderstanding Recursive Systems

Martin & Doran (2023: 30-1):

What about the link between “logical” systems and iterative structures?

Rose (2001, 2021) presents overviews of logical resources in Western Desert (Pitjantjatjara), taking into account the possibility of what he calls simplexes, duplexes and series – with the choice of series leading to a recursive system realised by iterative structure. For nominal group choices, he notes that the series option is not available for grading within Epithets. So an adjective can be graded once, but we do not find series such as very much more difficult. An example of a grading duplex is presented in (17), adapted from Rose (2021:70).

Rose (2021) further reports that paratactic series are possible for Pitjantjatjara groups and words in general, but that hypotactic relations at these ranks (and certain choices at clause rank) are restricted to duplexes – in orbital terms a head and just one dependent satellite. His work thus documents the possibility of logical systems realised by non-iterative structures.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, even Rose (2001: 368) acknowledges that he took the terms 'simplex' and 'duplex' from Matthiessen (1995).

[2] To be clear, this misunderstands the basic nature of a recursive system. A recursive system is one which provides the option of re-entering the same system.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 438) provide an example:

In the case of a simplex, a single rank unit, the RECURSION system is not entered, because the system is a means of specifying iterative structures (complexes). In the case of a duplex, a two-unit complex, the feature 'stop' is selected (along with the other features that specify the tactic and logico-semantic relations of the complex). In the case of a "series", a complex of three or more units, the feature 'go on' is selected, and the system is re-entered, and either 'stop' or 'go on' is then selected, depending on how many units in the complex.

[3] To be clear, the 'grading within Epithets' is realised by a two-unit word complex, an iterative structure realising a recursive system at word rank. In this case, the recursive system is entered, and the feature 'stop' is selected, as explained above.

[4] To be clear, Rose's 'grading duplex' is simply the word complex that realises the submodification in the nominal group:

[5] To be clear, Martin proposes orbital structure as experiential, but here the authors have used it to describe a hypotactic logical structure. As previously observed, Martin's orbital structure misconstrues multivariate experiential structure as hypotactic logical structure. Here the authors reveal that misunderstanding themselves.

[6] This is misleading, because it is not true. Rose's work does not document the possibility of logical systems realised by non-iterative structures, because it presents an iterative structure, a two-unit word complex, that realises a recursive system, as demonstrated above.

Falsely Claiming That Multivariate Structures Involve Recursive Systems

Martin & Doran (2023: 30):

To this point we have established that what have been traditionally viewed as nominal group multivariate structures in fact involve both non-recursive systems (responsible for English Deictic, Numerative and Thing functions for example) and recursive systems (as exemplified by English Epithets and Qualifiers above).

 

Blogger Comments:

This is misleading, because it is not true. The authors have not established that multivariate structures of the nominal group involve recursive systems. As previously demonstrated, the recursive system involved for multiple Epithets is located at word rank, and is realised by a univariate structure, a word complex, that serves as an Epithet at group rank. The example presented as multiple Qualifiers was a single Qualifier realised by an embedded clause complex. In this case, the recursive system involved also specified a univariate structure: the logically related interdependent clauses that were embedded as Qualifier.

Misrepresenting Recursive Systems As Specifying Experiential Structures

Martin & Doran (2023: 30):

The possibility of multiple Epithets (English) and Qualifiers (Korean and English) indicates that too strict an association of non-recursive systems with experiential structure is not tenable. Recursive systems clearly underlie both the English Epithets and Korean Epithets and Qualifiers exemplified above.⁷

⁷ At first blush Halliday’s (1985) analysis of English Classifiers would appear to exemplify a comparable pattern. But English Classifiers do not each independently modify the Thing (the structure is serial not orbital). In fact structures of this kind would be better modelled as hypotactic word complexes recursively taxonomising the entity construed by the Thing function (see Martin et al. 2021 for discussion).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is misleading because it is untrue. The 'multiple Epithets' example demonstrated that the experiential function is realised by a logical structure at word rank: a paratactic or hypotactic word complex. The 'multiple Qualifiers' example featured an embedded clause complex serving as a single Qualifier.

[2] To be clear, firstly, this misconstrues experiential structure (the Classifier–Thing relation) as logical ('modify', 'serial'). Secondly, it claims that both the Classifier and the Thing are both Heads, since Martin's serial structure is 'multi-nuclear'. Thirdly, Martin's serial structure misconstrues univariate structure as parataxis ('multi-nuclear'). Fourthly, it proposes a different structure type (serial) for just two elements of a nominal group: Classifier(s) and Thing. 

[3] This is misleading. Firstly, the notion that the Classifier 'taxonomises' the Thing is Halliday (1985), not Martin (2021). Halliday (1985: 160, 164):

This is an experiential structure which, taken as a whole, has the function of specifying (i) a class of things, namely trains, and (ii) some category of membership within this class. We shall refer to the element expressing the class by the functional label Thing. … 

The Classifier indicates a particular subclass of the thing in question, e.g. electric trains, passenger trains, wooden trains, toy trains.

Secondly, the notion that a Classifier can be realised by a hypotactic word complex is Halliday (1985), not Martin (2021), as expressed in Matthiessen (1995: 665):

CLASSIFICATION is the resource for specifying successively more specific classes of a thing; it is used to represent taxonomies. Table 7-14 presents a few examples from geology.

The recursive system is, of course, logical and at word rank.

Misconstruing Multivariate And Paratactic Structures As Having "Heads"

 Martin & Doran (2023: 25):

For particulate structure this means bringing nuclearity into the picture and re-interpreting multivariate structures as orbital (with satellites related to a single nucleus) and univariate structures as serial (i.e. multi-nuclear). This additional variable (i.e. nuclearity) allows for the recognition of “heads” in both experiential and logical structures. The canonical “head” in an orbital structure is exemplified by the Thing in nominal groups, the Event in verbal groups or the configuration of Process and Medium in clause structure; the canonical “head” in serial structure is the α variable in hypotactic complexes – e.g. the primary tense choice in an English or Spanish verbal group (Martin et al. 2023) or the projecting clause in a reporting clause complex across languages.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as previously explained, Martin's model of structure misconstrues multivariate experiential structure as hypotactic univariate logical structure, and so it is this misconstrual that 'allows for the recognition of "heads" in experiential structures'. However, because Martin's model of structure misconstrues univariate logical structure as paratactic univariate structures, it does not 'allow for the recognition of "heads" in logical structures', since a paratactic structure links elements of equal status, and as such, has no Head element.

[2] This is potentially misleading. To be clear, unacknowledged by Martin & Doran, the notion of Process and Medium as nucleus in the ergative model of the English clause appears in Halliday (1985: 147):

The Process and the Medium together form the nucleus of an English clause; and this nucleus then determines the range of options that are available to the rest of the clause. Thus the nucleus ‘tear + cloth’ represents a small semantic field that may be realised as a clause either alone or in combination with other participant or circumstantial functions.

Importantly, for Halliday, the meaning of 'nucleus' is distinct from the meaning of 'head', which is why he uses the different terms. The nuclear model construes a cline from the most central to the most peripheral. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 348):

the nucleus of ‘Process + Medium’ has an inner ring of additional participants as well as an outer ring of circumstances surrounding it: see Figure 5-40.

[3] To be clear, this is an instance of self-contradiction. If Martin models logical structure as serial (i.e. multinuclear), and it is nuclearity that 'allows for the recognition of heads', then, in a logical structure every single nucleus is a head, and there are no satellites.

[4] This is misleading, because it invites the reader to falsely credit Martin et al. (2023) with the insight that the realisation of primary tense serves as the element of the logical structure of a verbal group. Halliday (1985: 177):

The primary tense is that functioning as Head, shown as α.